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Abstract 
We examined police officers’ (N = 71) perceptions of statement inconsistency types (within-
statement, between-statement, statement-evidence, and within-group inconsistencies). 
Approximately half of the officers reported looking for statement inconsistency to detect 
deception. Officers generally associated contradictions and omissions with deception, and 
repetitions and reminiscences with truthfulness, but they were most likely to use contradictions. 
Officers reported using statement-evidence inconsistency more than any other inconsistency 
type, and they believed it was the easiest type to assess. Younger officers tended to believe that 
liars attempt to eliminate within-statement inconsistency unless they are strategically presented 
with incriminating evidence. Moreover, the majority of officers indicated that they have used 
drawings to assess inconsistencies with suspects’ verbal statements. Finally, suspects’ criminal 
history, intelligence, and personality were believed to influence statement (in)consistency. These 
findings are discussed in light of the literature on statement inconsistency, and recommendations 
regarding the applied use of statement inconsistency types are offered.  
Keywords: police officers, inconsistency, survey, legal decision-making  
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Police Officers’ Perceptions of Statement Inconsistency 
According to investigative practitioners, statement inconsistency is one of the most 
important cues to deception (Akehurst, Köhknken, Vrij, & Bull, 1996; Granhag, Strömwall, & 
Hartwig, 2005; Greuel, 1992; Strömwall & Granhag, 2003). Despite practitioners’ reliance on 
this cue, research has not focused on how practitioners attempt to detect deception through 
statement inconsistency or how they perceive different types of statement inconsistency. In the 
current study, police officers’ perceptions and use of different types of statement inconsistency 
were examined.  
There is a general tendency among practitioners and laypeople to perceive consistent 
statements as truthful, and inconsistent statements as deceptive (Granhag, Andersson, Strömwall, 
& Hartwig, 2004; Granhag & Strömwall, 2000; Lakhani & Taylor, 2003; Strömwall, Granhag, & 
Jonsson, 2003; Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010). This consistency heuristic has been empirically 
refuted as liars are often as consistent as, and sometimes more consistent than, truth-tellers 
(Granhag & Strömwall, 2002; Granhag, Strömwall, & Jonsson, 2003). These findings may be 
explained by the ‘repeat versus reconstruct’ hypothesis (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999), which 
posits that liars prepare and rehearse their statements for the investigative interview(s), so they 
can repeat the same details within and across interviews. In contrast, truth-tellers provide their 
statements by recalling information from memory, which is susceptible to omissions (missing or 
forgetting to report details that were previously reported) as well as reminiscences (recollecting 
previously unreported details; Fisher, Brewer, & Mitchell, 2009). This ensuing inconsistency is 
more likely to occur if the event is poorly encoded, if there is a delay between the event and the 
interview, and/or if there is a delay between the interviews (Cohen, 2001; Harvey, Vrij, Leal, 
Hope, & Mann, 2017; Tulving & Thomson, 1973). Hence, truth-tellers reconstruct information 
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when they recall the target event, and that consequently increases their statement inconsistency 
across interviews (Fisher, Vrij, & Leins, 2013; Odinot, Memon, La Rooy, & Millen, 2013). 
Types of Statement Inconsistency 
Scholars have examined four types of statement inconsistency (for an overview, see 
Vredeveldt, van Koppen, & Granhag, 2014): i) within-statement inconsistency (lack of 
correspondence between details provided by one suspect at different points within a single 
interview); ii) between-statement inconsistency (lack of correspondence between details 
provided by one suspect across repeated interviews); iii) statement-evidence inconsistency (lack 
of correspondence between details provided by a single suspect and available evidence); and iv) 
within-group inconsistency (lack of correspondence between details provided by different 
suspects in a single case involving multiple suspects). 
Research has demonstrated that simply observing suspects’ statement inconsistency does 
not enhance deception detection (Granhag & Strömwall, 2001b; Vrij et al., 2009). The reason for 
this is that liars prepare for the interview by anticipating questions that may be asked and 
rehearsing responses to them (Chan & Bull, 2014; Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007; Vrij, 
Mann, Leal, & Granhag, 2010). Preparation may enhance liars’ consistency and liars may 
become as consistent as truth-tellers (Granhag & Strömwall, 2002).  
However, the interviewer may play an active role in the interview by making the 
interview more cognitively demanding for liars than for truth-tellers (Vrij, Granhag, Mann, & 
Leal, 2011). That is, the interviewer may ask questions that disrupt liars’ preparations for the 
interview which will make it difficult for liars to provide spontaneous responses. Liars will have 
to think of how best to respond to these questions which increases the cognitive load imposed on 
them and eventually depletes their cognitive resources. If the interviewer asks unanticipated 
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questions that a liar have not prepared for (Vrij et al., 2009), the cognitive demands of the 
interview increase. These questions may not be difficult for truth-tellers, because truth-tellers do 
not need to prepare for the interview as they respond to questions by recalling information from 
memory (Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Doering, 2010; Vrij, Mann, et al., 2010). Increasing 
questions’ difficulty for liars but not for truth-tellers elicits verbal cues to deception, such as 
fewer details and higher statement inconsistency, and thus enhances lie detection (Granhag, Vrij, 
& Verschuere, 2015; Lancaster, Vrij, Hope, & Waller, 2013; Mac Giolla & Granhag, 2015).  
An example of an unanticipated question is asking for a drawing of the alibi location or 
of the target event (Vrij, Leal, et al., 2010; Vrij, Mann, Leal & Fisher, 2012). Liars tend to find 
drawings more difficult than truth-tellers, because they have to be detailed and consistent in 
reporting spatial information (i.e., locating objects in their correct location) they have not 
prepared. Previous research has shown that drawings are more effective than verbal statements in 
reducing the number of details, plausibility, and within-group consistency in liars’ statements 
more than in truth-tellers’ statements (Vrij et al., 2009; Vrij, Leal, et al., 2010; Vrij, Mann, et al., 
2012). Given the ease and efficacy of using drawings (Mac Giolla, Granhag, & Vernham, 2017), 
they are being increasingly used in investigative interviews (Dando, Wilcock, & Milne, 2009) 
and accepted as evidence in courts (e.g., United Kingdom; Geiselman 2012; Marlow & 
Hilbourne, 2011).  
Another unanticipated question that liars would not prepare for is asking for a reverse 
order narration of the target event which reduces the level of within-statement consistency 
among liars more than truth-tellers (Vrij, Leal, Mann, & Fisher, 2012). Also, introducing 
unanticipated changes in question format such as asking suspects for a drawing and then for a 
verbal statement or vice versa (Leins, Fisher, & Vrij, 2012; Leins, Fisher, Vrij, Leal, & Mann, 
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2011) or asking general questions followed by specific, non-sequentially ordered questions 
(Deeb et al., 2017) reduces the levels of between-statement consistency, and in some cases 
within-statement consistency, in liars’ statements more than in truth-tellers’ statements. Truth-
tellers perceive these questions as less difficult than liars, because truth-tellers encode the event 
along several dimensions so they can recall information from memory along a different 
dimension (Leins et al., 2012; Vrij et al., 2011). For liars, however, the interview is already 
taxing given the cognitive load imposed by having to lie. Therefore, asking liars questions 
different from those for which they prepared would deplete their cognitive resources and 
ultimately reduce consistency in their statements (Vrij et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, the manner in which evidence is presented in the interview is critical to 
increase the interview difficulty for liars more than for truth-tellers (Hartwig, Granhag, 
Strömwall, & Vrij, 2005). That is, if evidence is presented early in the interview, liars may find a 
non-incriminating explanation that is consistent with evidence. However, if evidence is presented 
strategically after exhausting all explanations for it, liars will find it difficult to maintain 
statement consistency. The Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE) technique was developed to test 
these assumptions (Granhag, Vrij, et al., 2015). An interviewer who holds potentially 
incriminating piece(s) of evidence against the suspect may use the SUE technique. First, the 
interviewer asks general and specific questions about the relevant event without confronting the 
suspect with the evidence. After exhausting all possible explanations for the evidence, the 
suspect is presented with the piece(s) of evidence by first referencing it as weak and imprecise 
(e.g., there is information showing that the suspect was at the crime scene) and gradually 
presenting it in a stronger and more precise manner (e.g., there is CCTV footage showing the 
suspect at the crime scene). Granhag and colleagues showed that the SUE technique is superior 
POLICE OFFICERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF INCONSISTENCY  7 
 
to the early presentation of evidence and elicits significantly more statement-evidence 
inconsistency, within-group inconsistency, and within-statement inconsistency in liars’ than in 
truth-tellers’ statements (Granhag, Rangmar, & Strömwall, 2015; Granhag, Strömwall, Willén, & 
Hartwig, 2013). Taken together, past research demonstrates the importance of taking the 
interview protocol into consideration when detecting deception by carefully preparing which 
questions to ask as well as when and how to ask them. 
The Current Study 
Previous surveys investigating police officers’ perceptions of lie detection have included 
lists of predetermined verbal and nonverbal cues, which officers rated as indicative of deception 
or truth (e.g., Akehurst et al., 1996; Strömwall & Granhag, 2003). In such studies, statement 
inconsistency was repeatedly rated as one of the most important cues to deception with up to 
87% of officers agreeing that it is diagnostic of deception (Granhag et al., 2005; Greuel, 1992; 
Strömwall & Granhag, 2003). Accordingly, we devised a questionnaire that focused specifically 
on statement inconsistency. We examined how officers perceive different inconsistency types 
and how these are used to detect deception.  
Investigative practitioners generally use the consistency heuristic by presuming that the 
consistency measure ‘repetitions’ indicates truthfulness whereas the inconsistency measures 
(omissions, reminiscences, and contradictions) indicate deception (Fisher et al., 2009, 2013; 
Granhag et al., 2005). Hence, we expected surveyed officers in our study to associate repetitions 
with truthfulness and contradictions, reminiscences, and omissions with deception (Hypothesis 
1). Moreover, previous research has suggested that officers tend to look for contradictions more 
than any other (in)consistency measure (Granhag et al., 2005; Masip & Herrero, 2015).  
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Accordingly, we predicted that officers would report looking for contradictions more than for 
reminiscences, omissions, or repetitions (Hypothesis 2).  
A previous study by Granhag and Strömwall (2001a) revealed that in the presence of 
repeated statements by a single suspect, laypeople tend to look for between-statement 
inconsistency more than for within-statement inconsistency. As laypeople and investigative 
practitioners share similar views on deception cues, including statement inconsistency (Akehurst 
et al., 1996; Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij, & Merckelbach, 2016; Granhag et al., 2004; Masip et al., 
2017; Vrij, Akehurst, & Knight, 2006), we expected officers to report relying more on between-
statement inconsistency than on within-statement inconsistency in the presence of different 
statements from a single suspect (Hypothesis 3).  
Statement-Evidence inconsistency is perceived by investigative practitioners as a valid 
indicator of deception (Granhag et al., 2005; Greuel, 1992; Masip & Herrero, 2015). Hence, we 
predicted that officers would report looking for statement-evidence inconsistency more than any 
other type of inconsistency (Hypothesis 4). In line with this hypothesis, we expected them to find 
it easier to accurately assess statement-evidence inconsistency than any other type of 
inconsistency (Hypothesis 5).  
Officers were asked if they thought that liars who are presented with incriminating 
evidence, after explanations for it have been exhausted, would be more likely to change their 
statement to fit it with the evidence or to maintain their statement, risking statement-evidence 
inconsistency. Previous research has found that police officers in several countries tend to 
employ the Strategic Use of Evidence technique in investigative interviews (Tekin, Granhag, 
Strömwall, & Vrij, 2017). The application of this technique is more likely to elicit statement-
evidence inconsistency than within-statement inconsistency in liars’ statements (Granhag et al., 
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2013, Tekin, Granhag, Strömwall, & Vrij, 2016). Accordingly, it was speculated that officers’ 
experience may have made them notice this behavior, so they would report that liars are more 
likely to be inconsistent with the evidence than within their statements (Hypothesis 6). In line 
with this hypothesis, we expected officers to report that liars generally attempt to eliminate 
within-statement inconsistency more than any other type of inconsistency (Hypothesis 7). 
Officers were not expected to report any differences in the levels of statement inconsistency 
types for truth-tellers. 
We also explored issues not yet empirically examined, but of importance in this context. 
Questions about these issues were open-ended. At the beginning of the questionnaire (inserted 
before the closed questions), officers were asked about the verbal cue(s) they were most likely to 
use to detect deception. Previous research has shown that investigative practitioners use 
statement inconsistency to a large extent in their decisions (Granhag et al., 2005; Greuel, 1992), 
so the purpose of this question was to explore the type of inconsistency they were most likely to 
employ in their decision making. Officers were also asked about their approach to assessing 
within-statement inconsistency, which may be more difficult to evaluate compared to other 
inconsistency types. Moreover, officers indicated if and how they implemented drawings in 
interviews to assess inconsistencies.  
Last of all, officers were asked about their perceptions of possible factors (suspects’ age, 
gender, level of education, social class, criminal history, personality, intelligence, race, 
nationality, and language proficiency) that might influence suspects’ statement inconsistency. 
We are not aware of any study that investigated police officers’ perceptions of the effects of 
suspects’ characteristics and backgrounds on statement inconsistency. However, a number of 
previous studies have examined the effects of these factors on deception detection. One study 
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found that police officers perceived suspects with a criminal record to be good at lying (Moston 
& Stephenson, 1992). Suspects acquainted with investigative interviewing have extensive 
opportunities to receive feedback regarding their behavior which eventually make them good at 
hiding their lies (Granhag et al., 2004; Granhag, Clemens, & Strömwall, 2009; Hartwig, 
Granhag, Strömwall, & Andersson, 2004). Also, some studies have shown that police officers 
erroneously believed that younger children and adolescents are generally poor at controlling their 
behavior (Vrij, Akehurst, et al., 2006) despite research demonstrating this population is good at 
behavioral control (Blandón-Gitlin, Pezdek, Rogers, & Brodie, 2005; Gongola, Scurich, & Quas, 
2017).  
Method 
Participants  
We recruited police officers formally or informally through contacts in police 
departments in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom (UK). Following stakeholders’ 
approvals, the first author or the contacts from the police departments sent an email to police 
officers in the respective departments to complete a questionnaire about ‘police officers’ 
perceptions of cues to deception’. Officers with at least three years of experience in investigative 
interviewing were eligible to participate. The response rate was 10% for Australian officers, 
whom the first author contacted. We cannot estimate the response rate by officers in Canada and 
the UK, because the questionnaire was circulated by the contacts from the respective department, 
so the original number of recipients cannot be known. 
A total of 71 officers completed the questionnaire, of whom 52 were male (73%) and 19 
were female (27%). Their age ranged between 31 and 60 (M = 41.80, SD = 7.13). All were 
Caucasian except one who was Hispanic. Thirty-eight were from Australia (54%), 17 from the 
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UK (24%), and 16 from Canada (22%). The majority of Australian officers were detective senior 
constables (n = 22) and detective sergeants (n = 13), and three other officers held inspector rank. 
Among UK officers, 14 were detective constables, one was an inspector, and two did not report 
their rank. Among Canadian officers, nine were identified as detectives, two as sergeants, three 
as corporals, and two as constables. Of the total sample, 46 indicated they were native English 
speakers (65%), 10 spoke English at an advanced level (14%), and one spoke English at the 
intermediate level (1%). The level of proficiency in English was not obtained for 14 officers in 
the UK (20%), because the item was added to the questionnaire after it had circulated to those 
officers (this was the only added item in the questionnaire). However, given new regulations in 
the UK requiring police officer candidates to be bilingual (Tonkin, 2015), as well as the 
requirement that non-native police candidates have an English language qualification and 
complete a training course offered in English (Metropolitan Police, 2018), UK officers would be 
expected to be proficient in English at least at the intermediate level. 
The officers’ years of experience in interviewing suspects ranged from 3 to 40 years (M = 
16.80, SD = 7.86). Officers did not consider themselves up-to-date with the scientific literature 
on statement inconsistency (M = 2.57, SD = 1.69, on a 7-point scale from 1 = not up-to-date at 
all to 7 = extremely up-to-date). Although 27 reported being trained in statement inconsistency to 
detect deception (38%), 44 reported not having received such training (62%). Among officers 
who reported receiving training, very few were specific about the training they received, with the 
majority reporting having received basic training at the moderate level (mainly Tier/Level 2 or 3 
training). Only nine officers mentioned more specific training such as Criteria-Based Content 
Analysis (Vrij, 2005), cognitive load interviewing (Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2017; Vrij, Jundi, et 
al., 2012), and the Strategic Use of Evidence (Granhag et al., 2013).  
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Questionnaire 
We devised a questionnaire based on the existing literature to understand police officers’ 
perceptions of statement inconsistency types and suspects’ attempts at eliminating these 
inconsistencies. The questionnaire was in English and a pilot study with four police officers and 
eight postgraduate students (four of them worked with investigative practitioners previously) 
showed that it took approximately 20 minutes to complete. Officers had the option to fill out the 
questionnaire either online or on paper. Fifty-eight officers (82%) completed the questionnaire 
online and 13 (18%) on paper. Officers were informed that their responses would be treated 
confidentially, and they were asked to sign a consent form. Those who completed the online 
version were instructed that uncompleted questionnaires would be deleted and not included in 
the analyses. 
The questionnaire comprised eight closed questions rated on 7-point scales (see notes in 
Table 1 for anchors), some of which were followed by open-ended questions to allow officers to 
expand on their responses. Two other questions on drawings and factors influencing 
inconsistency were also closed with yes/no response options (and a ‘maybe’ alternative for the 
influential factors question) and followed by open-ended questions. In addition, the questionnaire 
included two exploratory open-ended questions. In the first question, officers were asked about 
verbal cues they use to detect deception; the aim of this question was to investigate the type of 
statement inconsistency that will be reported most frequently. The second question explored how 
officers assessed within-statement inconsistency in single statements by a single suspect. 
Importantly, definitions of inconsistency types and (in)consistency measures (adapted from 
Vredeveldt et al., 2014 and Fisher et al., 2009 respectively) were provided in the questionnaire to 
clarify them to officers. 
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Coding 
Two coders coded the responses for six open-ended questions. One coder classified all 
responses into general categories that were data driven (i.e. not predetermined), as shown in 
Table 2. One of the categories was labelled ‘other’, because it included themes that were 
reported by fewer than 8% of the total sample and that could not be classified into one of the 
other categories. Responses from some officers were allocated to more than one category.  
The second coder allocated the responses to the categories adopted by the first coder. The 
Intra-Class Correlation coefficient, which measures inter-rater reliability between the two coders, 
for the open-ended questions was .89. 
Results  
In this section, we first present the results for scale items of the questionnaire along with 
their follow-up open-ended questions (closed questions subsection). We then report the results of 
a correlational analysis conducted between years of experience in interviewing, age, and officers’ 
ratings to the closed questions. Lastly, the analyses for the exploratory and open-ended questions 
are presented (open-ended questions subsection). Table 1 shows the means and standard 
deviations for the closed questions. Table 2 displays the percentages of responses within 
categories for the open-ended questions. The analyses for each questionnaire item and the 
corresponding items in the tables are numbered to make it easier for the reader to follow.  
Separate analyses of the data from officers who completed either the online or the paper 
questionnaire yielded similar results, so we present the combined results of the online and paper 
questionnaire data. The data-analytic strategy was to conduct repeated-measures ANOVAs 
comparing the responses on the rated categories, and to follow up with Bonferroni post hoc tests. 
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For some ANOVAs, the assumption of sphericity was not fulfilled, so the corrected degrees of 
freedom according to the Huynh-Feldt procedure are reported.  
Table 1 about here 
Closed Questions  
1. Police officers’ perceptions of (in)consistency measures  
A repeated measures ANOVA showed that officers believed that repetitions, 
reminiscences, omissions, and contradictions differed significantly from each other, F(1.90, 
133.31) = 32.83, p < .001, ηp2 = .32. The means in Table 1 show that repetitions and 
reminiscences were generally rated above the scale midpoint of 3.5, meaning that they were 
associated with honesty, whereas contradictions and omissions, which were rated below this 
midpoint, were associated with deception. This finding partially supported Hypothesis 1, which 
posited that officers would associate repetitions with honesty and reminiscences, omissions, and 
contradictions with deception. Bonferroni post hoc tests revealed that officers believed that 
contradictions differed from all other measures (all ps < .001), reminiscences differed from 
repetitions and omissions (both ps = .002), and omissions differed from repetitions (p < .001). 
2. Police officers’ use of (in)consistency measures to detect deception  
A repeated measures ANOVA showed that officers reported significant differences in the 
extent to which they looked for consistency measures to detect deception, F(2.50, 174.99) = 
35.74, p < .001, ηp2 = .34. Post hoc analyses revealed that officers reported looking for 
contradictions significantly more than any other consistency measure (all ps < .001). They did 
not differ significantly in the extent to which they looked for other (in)consistency measures (all 
ps > .05). These results supported Hypothesis 2. 
3. Police officers’ perceptions of between-statement inconsistency 
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A repeated measures ANOVA revealed that in the presence of different statements from a 
single suspect, officers reported that they would look for within-statement inconsistency and 
between-statement inconsistency to the same extent, F(1, 70) = 0.44, p = .509, ηp2 = .006. Hence, 
Hypothesis 3, which posited that officers would report looking for between-statement 
inconsistency more than for within-statement inconsistency, was not supported.  
4. Police officers’ perceptions of statement inconsistency types 
A repeated measures ANOVA revealed that in cases where officers potentially could 
assess all types of inconsistencies (i.e., statements by multiple suspects in a single case who are 
interviewed more than once and against whom incriminating evidence exists), officers reported 
significant differences in the extent to which they looked for statement inconsistency types, 
F(2.61, 182.95) = 17.89, p < .001, ηp2 = .20. Bonferroni post hoc tests revealed that officers 
reported looking for statement-evidence inconsistency more than within-statement inconsistency 
between-statement inconsistency and within-group inconsistency (all ps ≤ .002).  Hence, 
Hypothesis 4 was supported. They also reported looking for within-group inconsistency more 
than within-statement inconsistency (p = .050). No other significant differences emerged.   
Follow-up open-ended responses confirmed these findings as 39% of officers reported 
that statement-evidence inconsistency is the most reliable inconsistency type. Sixteen percent 
believed that truth-tellers might be inconsistent across interviews due to time lag and forgetting, 
14% reported that all inconsistency types are useful, and 8% reported that within-group 
inconsistency is the least reliable because liars can collude and be consistent or because it is 
difficult to validate statements in cases where multiple suspects are involved. Officers who 
generally provided responses from an empirical perspective were more likely to report that liars 
prepare for the interview, liars may be more consistent than truth-tellers, and truth-tellers may be 
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more inconsistent across interviews if there is a long delay between event and interview or if 
multiple interviews are conducted. These officers seemed to believe that (in)consistency 
measures and types were not valid cues to deception; rather, reasons for any (in)consistency 
needed to be further investigated and validated with facts to make more informed veracity 
judgments. 
5. Police officers’ perceptions of the difficulty of assessing inconsistency types 
A repeated measures ANOVA revealed that officers believed that inconsistency types 
differed significantly in how difficult they are to assess , F(2.72, 190.33) = 19.00, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.21. Post hoc analyses indicated that officers found statement-evidence inconsistency 
significantly less difficult to assess than other inconsistency types (all ps < .001), which 
supported Hypothesis 5. They did not differ significantly in the extent to which they rated the 
difficulty of assessing other inconsistency types (all ps > .05). 
6. Police officers’ perceptions of statement inconsistency following the strategic disclosure 
of evidence  
A repeated measures ANOVA showed that officers believed that liars who are 
strategically presented with a piece of evidence would attempt to change their statement to fit it 
with the evidence (within-statement inconsistency) significantly more than they would stick to 
their original statement (statement-evidence inconsistency), F(1, 70) = 10.77, p = .002, ηp2 = .13. 
This finding refuted Hypothesis 6, which postulated that officers are more likely to believe that 
liars in these situations would exhibit higher statement-evidence inconsistency than within-
statement inconsistency. 
7. Police officers’ perceptions of suspects’ attempts at eliminating inconsistency types 
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A repeated measures ANOVA showed that officers believed that liars differ in the extent 
to which they attempt to eliminate within-statement inconsistency, F(2.68, 187.79) = 9.09, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .12. Post hoc analyses indicated that they thought liars were significantly more likely 
to eliminate within-statement inconsistency than between-statement inconsistency, statement-
evidence inconsistency, and within-group inconsistency (all ps ≤ .004). No other significant 
differences emerged. Another repeated measures ANOVA revealed that officers did not believe 
that truth-tellers would attempt to eliminate any type of inconsistency more than another, F(1.64, 
114.79) = 3.08, p = .060, ηp2 = .04. These results supported Hypothesis 7.  
Officers who responded to the follow-up open-ended question, in which they were able to 
elaborate on their responses, believed that truth-tellers are generally consistent (29%), maintain 
within-statement consistency (22%), and/or add information across statements (10%). Some 
officers considered liars to be generally consistent (22%), whereas others believed that liars are 
generally inconsistent (6%) or inconsistent across statements (14%). Twenty nine percent 
reported that evidence is important for liars. Eighteen percent indicated that liars would change 
their statement to fit it with the evidence, whereas only 4% mentioned that liars would maintain 
their statement following evidence disclosure. 
Correlational Analyses 
We conducted a correlational analysis for years of experience in interviewing, age, and 
officers’ ratings to the closed questions. Years of experience and age in were positively 
correlated, r = .84, p < .001. Years of experience was also negatively correlated with the belief 
that repetitions indicate truthfulness, r = -.31, p = .008, which means that Hypothesis 1 on 
repetitions may be true for novice officers but not experienced officers. Also, age was negatively 
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correlated with the belief that liars attempt to eliminate within-statement inconsistency, r = -.35, 
p = .002, which means that Hypothesis 7 may be only true for younger officers.  
Table 2 about here 
Open-Ended Questions 
1. Police officers’ use of verbal cues to detect deception 
The most frequently reported verbal cues were the amount of detail (62%) and statement 
inconsistency (46%). More categories are displayed in Table 2. The ‘other’ category included 
infrequently mentioned cues such as repeating questions, denial, and forthcomingness. Among 
officers specifying the type of statement inconsistency, 40% referred to statement-evidence 
inconsistency, 36% referred to within-statement inconsistency, and 24% referred to between-
statement inconsistency. None of the officers mentioned within-group inconsistency, most 
probably due to the open-ended nature of this question.  
2. Police officers’ perceptions of within-statement inconsistency 
When determining within-statement inconsistency, officers looked for cues such as the 
number of details and plausibility of the statement (34%) and contradictions (32%). They also 
reported using active interview techniques such as asking the suspect for a reverse order 
narration of events or probing with more in-depth questions to elicit inconsistencies (34%). They 
noted they may use evidence to corroborate their judgments (by comparing the suspect’s 
statement with evidence [31%] or by confronting the suspect with evidence after exhausting 
alternative explanations [27%]), see Table 2. The ‘other’ category included responses such as 
suspects’ refusal to answer and suspects’ possible gain from lying.  
3. Police officers’ use of drawings to assess statement inconsistency 
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Forty-eight officers (68%) reported using drawings in one or more of their interviews to 
detect deception. Thirty-four of them (71%) used the drawings to assess statement 
inconsistencies. Among these 34 officers, 44% compared the drawing with the suspect’s verbal 
statements and 33% compared it with evidence. Table 2 displays more categories. The ‘other’ 
category included responses such as using drawings as an additional assessment tool, and 
considering the effect of delay between the crime and the interview.  
4. Police officers’ perceptions of possible influential factors on statement inconsistency 
Officers were provided with a list of suspect characteristics and asked if these 
characteristics influence statement inconsistency. Officers believed that statement inconsistency 
is influenced by criminal history (65%), intelligence (59%), personality (59%), age (49%), 
education level (45%), language proficiency (45%), and to a lesser extent by social class (23%), 
nationality (20%), race (17%), and gender (9%). Officers’ elaborations on this question, as 
shown in Table 2, indicated that they considered suspects with a criminal history to have 
experience with investigative interviews (30%), which reduces inconsistency. Similarly, 
intelligence (15%) and certain personality factors (13%) were believed to reduce inconsistency. 
In contrast, suspects questioned in a second language (33%), young and elderly suspects (18%), 
and vulnerable suspects (10%) were considered as more susceptible to inconsistency. The ‘other’ 
category included other factors that might influence statement inconsistency such as 
miscommunication when truth-tellers misunderstand the questions but wish to be helpful, and 
barriers such as unwillingness to disclose intimate issues due to religious reasons. 
Discussion 
Police Officers’ Perceptions of (In)Consistency Measures 
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Self-reports by police officers indicated that they tend to use contradictions to assess 
credibility, and that they are less likely to look for repetitions, reminiscences, and omissions. 
This finding replicates previous research findings showing that investigative practitioners tend to 
assess contradictions more than any other (in)consistency measure (Granhag et al., 2005; Greuel, 
1992). This may be concerning. Laboratory research has indicated that contradictions rarely 
occur in suspects’ statements (Fisher et al., 2009; Granhag & Strömwall, 2002). Although it 
might be argued that this past laboratory research involved short interviews with participants and 
these interviews may have not been long enough to allow inconsistencies, studies examining real 
criminals’ strategies have shown that criminals attempt to withhold information and use their 
right to silence (Alison et al., 2014; Moston, Stephenson, & Williamson, 1992). If they decide to 
provide information, that information would be of a non-incriminating nature and consistent 
throughout the interview (Strömwall & Willén, 2011). Therefore, (in)consistency measures other 
than contradictions may be more readily available in suspects’ statements, and officers need to 
assess all available measures to understand the reasons for any (in)consistencies before reaching 
a decision on suspects’ veracity. In fact, officers who generally held evidence-based perceptions 
of lie detection and statement inconsistency were less likely to rely on (in)consistency measures 
to make judgments and more likely to refer to the context of the case to understand the 
motivations for any (in)consistency.  
Another finding that replicates previous research with practitioners is that officers 
associated contradictions and omissions with deception and repetitions with truthfulness, in line 
with the consistency heuristic (Granhag et al., 2004, 2005). It was interesting to find, however, 
that the more experienced officers were in interviewing, the less likely they were to associate 
repetitions with truthfulness. This finding implies that experience teaches officers that truth-
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tellers may not be able to repeat details in their statements because they reconstruct information 
from memory, and that liars are capable of being consistent, because they prepare and rehearse 
for interviews, in line with the repeat versus reconstruct hypothesis (Granhag & Strömwall, 
1999). Accordingly, experienced officers seem to hold evidence-based perceptions of suspect 
behavior.  
An unexpected finding was that officers associated reminiscences with truthfulness. Their 
responses to the open-ended questions may explain this finding. Officers reported that truth-
tellers may be inconsistent if there is a delay (time gap) between interviews. While some officers 
noted the effects of delay on forgetting information, others noted that truth-tellers may add 
information in subsequent interviews. Hence, officers seemed to be aware of the effects of 
memory which supports research findings demonstrating that truth-tellers provide additional 
information across statements, dependent on the questions asked (Cohen, 2001; Ewens, Vrij, 
Mann, & Leal, 2015; Fisher et al., 2009; Granhag & Strömwall, 2002).  
Police Officers’ Perceptions of Statement Inconsistency Types 
The most frequently reported verbal cues to deception were the amount of detail and 
statement inconsistency which replicates findings by previous studies (e.g., Granhag et al., 2005; 
Strömwall & Granhag, 2003). A meta-analysis on deception cues showed that the amount of 
details within a statement is one of the few reliable cues to deception (DePaulo et al., 2003). 
Statement inconsistency, however, may not be a reliable cue across all situations, because liars 
may prepare and repeat rehearsed information during interviews, whereas truth-tellers recall and 
reconstruct information from memory (repeat versus reconstruct hypothesis; Granhag & 
Strömwall, 1999, 2002). Hence, liars’ statements may be as consistent as truth-tellers’ statements 
(Sakrisvold, Granhag, & Mac Giolla, 2017; Vrij et al., 2009). 
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In line with these findings and as predicted, officers tended to rate statement-evidence 
inconsistency as the most useful inconsistency type to detecting deception. According to their 
reports, any form of decision making is best substantiated by evidence. The concrete nature of 
evidence makes it easier and less time consuming to look for this type of inconsistency compared 
to other types. This replicates previous findings that investigative practitioners rely heavily on 
evidence and facts and thus on statement-evidence inconsistency (Granhag et al., 2005; Greuel, 
1992; Park, Levine, McCornack, Morrison, & Ferrara, 2002). Nonetheless, physical evidence is 
not always available; rather, evidence is more likely to be available in the form of eyewitness 
testimony which is highly susceptible to inaccuracies or misjudgments (Scheck, Neufeld, & 
Dwyer, 2000; Williamson, Milne, & Savage, 2009). Also, even when physical evidence exists, it 
is evaluated in line with one’s preconceptions and expectations (Charman, Kavetski, Mueller, 
2017; Dror et al., 2011; Evans, Meissner, Brandon, Russano, & Kleinman, 2010; Kassin, 2015; 
Vrij, Meissner, et al., 2017). Hence, officers may need to look for more than one type of 
inconsistency to detect deception.  
Similar to previous research findings with laypeople (Strömwall et al., 2003), officers 
reported looking for within-group inconsistency when multiple suspects are involved in a case. 
However, not all officers agreed that within-group inconsistency is a reliable cue to deception. 
Some found it difficult to assess, because deceptive group members may rehearse together prior 
to the interview, have different motivations, or recall information differently. Nonetheless, with 
the implementation of strategic (Granhag et al., 2013) or unanticipated questioning techniques 
(Sooniste, Granhag, Strömwall, & Vrij, 2016; Vrij et al., 2009), within-group inconsistency may 
be elicited in liars more than in truth-tellers. 
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Officers did not differ in their reliance on between-statement inconsistency and within-
statement inconsistency, because they believed these to be the least useful inconsistency types. 
Time lapse between statements and memory factors were thought to jeopardize the 
meaningfulness of between-statement inconsistency. In addition, officers had divided views on 
whether liars or truth-tellers are more inconsistent across statements. The difficulty of assessing 
this type of inconsistency may be attributed to liars’ attempts at thoroughly rehearsing and thus 
repeating statements consistently across interviews (Granhag & Strömwall, 2002; Harvey et al., 
2017).  
Within-Statement inconsistency was thought to be the least useful type of inconsistency, 
because liars attempt to eliminate this type of inconsistency more than any other type. This is in 
line with our predictions and with previous research showing that liars attempt to eliminate 
within-statement inconsistency to a greater extent than between-statement inconsistency, within-
group inconsistency, and statement-evidence inconsistency (Deeb et al., 2017; Granhag et al., 
2013; Tekin et al., 2016).  
However, officers believed that when evidence is presented strategically and after all 
possible explanations for it have been exhausted, liars are likely to change their statement and fit 
it with the evidence. Although liars may eventually change their statement to be consistent with 
the evidence, they do not necessarily do this instantly (Granhag, Vrij, et al., 2015; Luke, 
Dawson, Hartwig, & Granhag, 2014). Research on the Strategic Use of Evidence technique has 
found that liars rarely changed their statement, and statement-evidence inconsistency was found 
to be a relatively more valid indicator than within-statement inconsistency in distinguishing liars 
and truth-tellers (Granhag, Rangmar, et al., 2015). These findings may be explained by liars’ 
counter-interrogation strategies as liars often use a withholding strategy (Granhag & Hartwig, 
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2008). Only when they estimate they can no longer maintain their statement do liars start giving 
more information or changing their statement (Granhag, Vrij, et al., 2015). Nonetheless, in line 
with officers’ beliefs, wherever a form of within-statement inconsistency exists, the suspect is 
more likely to be deceptive than truthful (Granhag et al., 2013; Tekin et al., 2016). 
It is important to point out that older police officers were less likely to believe that liars 
would avoid within-statement inconsistency more than other inconsistency types. A closer look 
at the open-ended responses demonstrated that older officers were very reliant on evidence. This 
suggests that older officers are unlikely to use contradictions and inconsistency types if evidence 
is not present; instead, they look at the context, similar to experienced officers. Given that age 
and experience were correlated, it may not be surprising that senior and experienced officers are 
more likely to look at the context in making veracity judgments than their younger and less 
experienced counterparts.  
Based on the overall findings, it is recommended that investigative practitioners look at 
inconsistency types simultaneously when possible. For example, in cases involving multiple 
suspects, it may not be enough to look at evidence. It might be necessary to compare suspects’ 
statements to understand if they are covering up for somebody or if they are minimizing their 
role in the crime. Accordingly, and as Granhag et al. (2013) pointed out: “We want to warn 
against putting one measure [statement-evidence inconsistency] against the other [within-
statement inconsistency]…. Our message is that both cues should be acknowledged and used, 
and that they may work in tandem to catch lying suspects.” (p. 11).  
It may be wise to simultaneously inspect different types of inconsistency in suspects’ 
statements while at the same time actively using the interview protocol to elicit inconsistency in 
liars’ statements (Vredeveldt et al., 2014). Police officers’ responses to the open-ended questions 
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revealed that 34% of the officers mentioned they played an active role in the interview by, for 
example, asking suspects for reverse order narrations of events to increase cognitive load or 
posing more in-depth questions. This rate may be even higher in real-life interviews, because (a) 
the question was open-ended and perhaps some officers missed mentioning interview 
manipulations they employ, and (b) the UK, Australia, and Canada are increasingly 
implementing information-gathering approaches to investigative interviewing and hence, officers 
are more likely to use evidence-based and ethical tactics during interviews (Alison, 2005; Walsh, 
Oxburgh, Redlich, & Myklebust, 2015). Although Canada is known for officially implementing 
the Reid Technique―an accusatory approach to interviewing that  is not empirically supported 
(Kassin, 2015; Vrij, Mann, & Fisher, 2006a, 2006b), Canadian police departments seem to be 
moving towards the use of information-gathering techniques (Quan, 2015; Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police, 2016; Williamson et al., 2009). The Canadian officers who were approached 
communicated that they use evidence-based techniques during interviews, including 
unanticipated questions and the Strategic Use of Evidence technique.   
Police Officers’ Use of Drawings to Assess Inconsistency 
More than half of the officers reported having used drawings during interviews to detect 
deception, and the majority compared the drawings with the suspect’s verbal statement(s) and 
less so with evidence. It may be that when officers have access to evidence, they compare the 
suspect’s verbal statement with evidence to assess inconsistency. However, when evidence is not 
available, drawings may be a valuable tool to assess inconsistency (Roos af Hjelmsäter, Öhman, 
Granhag, & Vrij, 2014; Vrij et al., 2009).  
In addition, officers thought drawings are a valuable tool to verify suspects’ veracity, 
because liars are more likely to refuse to provide or to complete a drawing. This is in line with 
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previous studies demonstrating that drawings are unexpected by suspects, and liars tend to 
provide less detailed, plausible and consistent drawings than truth-tellers (Leins et al., 2012; Vrij, 
Leal, et al., 2017; Vrij, Mann, et al., 2012). Accordingly, drawings are considered an important 
tool during interviews, even among novice officers (Dando et al., 2009). Officers are advised to 
assess the extent to which suspects are familiar with the alibi setting. Liars who are familiar with 
the alibi setting may be able to produce statements that are as consistent as those of truth-tellers 
(Blandón-Gitlin et al., 2005; Deeb et al., 2018; Warmelink, Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Poletiek, 2013). 
Police Officers’ Reports of Possible Influential Factors 
We explored possible factors that officers believed to influence suspects’ statement 
inconsistency. The most frequently reported influential factor was criminal history. Officers 
indicated that previous experience in interviewing would reduce suspect inconsistency. This is in 
line with previous research with inmates who reported that they attempt to eliminate 
inconsistency during interviews to appear truthful (Granhag et al., 2004, 2009; Strömwall & 
Willén, 2011). Also, the majority of officers mentioned intelligence and personality as influential 
factors. Similarly, deception research has demonstrated that manipulative, Machiavellian, and 
psychopathic personalities are generally more willing and better at deceiving others compared to 
more conscientious personalities (Cherulnik, Way, Ames, & Hutto, 1981; Kashy & DePaulo, 
1996; Vrij, 2008).  
Approximately half of the police officers thought that age, education level, and language 
proficiency are influential factors. Officers believed that young, old, and non-native suspects are 
likely to be inconsistent. However, research has shown that children as young as three years are 
good at lying (Ceci & DeSimone Leichtman, 1992), and deceptive children and adolescents are 
as consistent as their truthful counterparts (Roos af Hjelmsäter et al., 2014; Strömwall & 
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Granhag, 2005). Moreover, a study with non-native speakers revealed that truth-telling and 
deceptive suspects speaking in a second language were equally consistent in their statements as a 
result of the cognitive load imposed by the second language (Ewens et al., 2015). These results 
implicate that age and language proficiency do not necessarily facilitate lie detection. Hence, 
officers are cautioned against making erroneous judgments based on inconsistency cues. This is 
critical, because investigative practitioners are often confident in their veracity judgments—
whether with children or with adults—although they can detect lies at chance levels only (Bond 
& DePaulo, 2006; Elaad, 2003; Gongola et al., 2017; Vrij, Mann, Robbins, & Robinson, 2006). 
To remedy such misconceptions, it is necessary for officers to receive evidence-based training in 
detecting lies in different populations. Training may involve cognitive approaches to 
interviewing such as asking children to maintain eye contact (Lawrence et al., 2017) or asking 
non-native speakers to report an event in reverse order in the presence of an interpreter (Ewens et 
al., 2015). These techniques have been shown to facilitate lie detection by reducing the number 
of details and reminiscences in liars’ statements more than in truth-tellers’ statements. 
Officers also thought that police interviewing style has an effect on statement 
inconsistency. It has been empirically demonstrated that officers sometimes hold biases which 
they need to keep aside and use instead an information-gathering approach by asking open-ended 
questions that are formulated in accordance with the suspect’s comprehension level (Goodman-
Delahunty, Martschuk, & Dhami, 2014; Kassin, 2015; Vrij, Granhag, et al., 2010; Vrij et al., 
2006a). Fortunately, officers were aware of these problematic issues and some reiterated them 
throughout their responses. Finally, officers believed that suspects’ vulnerability, social class, 
nationality, race, and gender do not influence statement inconsistency. To our knowledge, the 
effects of these variables on inconsistency have not been previously examined, and field studies 
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with suspects may be particularly helpful in understanding their effects on statement 
inconsistency. 
Methodological Considerations 
 Questionnaires are self-report tools that have been criticized for not mirroring accurate 
cognitive processes (Fischhoff, 1975; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Stated differently, individuals do 
not necessarily have access to their higher order cognitive processes and hence may not 
accurately reflect on them. One way this could have been overcome in the questionnaire would 
be by asking officers to indicate the extent to which they use inconsistency types across different 
scenarios. However, the use of scenarios would limit the generalizability of the study results to 
similar scenarios only. Hence, the questions were kept broad to understand how officers use 
inconsistency types in general. Moreover, the findings concur with previous studies investigating 
police officers’ perceptions of statement inconsistency in other countries (Alison, 2005; Greuel, 
1992; Strömwall & Granhag, 2003; Tekin et al., 2017) as well as with experimental studies 
examining statement inconsistency (Granhag, Rangmar, et al., 2015; Mac Giolla & Granhag, 
2015), which support the validity of police officers’ reports in this study. 
Conclusions 
Our findings replicate and expand previous research on police officers’ perceptions of 
statement inconsistency. Officers seem to use the consistency heuristic and to rely heavily on 
contradictions and statement-evidence inconsistency to detect deception. Given that (a) 
inconsistency is not diagnostic of either deception or truth, (b) liars employ withholding 
strategies to eliminate within-statement inconsistency and to reduce contradictions in their 
statements, and (c) physical evidence rarely exists in actual cases, it is important for officers to 
rethink their views. Nonetheless, it was interesting to find that officers employing an 
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information-gathering approach to interviewing hold empirically supported views regarding 
suspects’ behaviors, and are able to reflect on suspects’ memory processes (reminiscences) and 
on suspects’ attempts at eliminating within-statement inconsistency. These reflections are critical 
to understanding liars’ and truth-tellers’ metacognitive processes and eventually to enhancing 
deception detection.  
Officers seem to be using inconsistency types and measures individually. Nonetheless, 
they are advised to evaluate these types and measures simultaneously to make more informed 
decisions about suspects’ deception and guilt. They also need to take the interview context and 
protocol into account; otherwise, the tendency to rely on (in)consistency may in some cases lead 
to mistaken judgements about the suspect’s guilt or innocence. Hence, even where evidence 
exists, officers need to consider multiple (in)consistency cues and search the context for 
explanations of these (in)consistencies.  
Officers who held evidence-based views (particularly older officers) were likely to 
consider the context when making legal decisions. It is important that younger officers keep an 
open mind and not narrowly focus on presumptions they may hold about deceptive behavior. 
These gaps in officers’ knowledge and focus may be remedied by further supervision from senior 
officers as well as by more collaborations with and training by investigative interviewing and lie 
detection scholars. 
 
  
POLICE OFFICERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF INCONSISTENCY  30 
 
References 
Akehurst, L., Köhnken, G., Vrij, A., & Bull, R. (1996). Lay persons’ and police officers’ beliefs 
regarding deceptive behaviour. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 10, 461–471. 
doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-0720(199612)10:6<461:AID-ACP413>3.0.CO;2-2 
Alison, L. (2005). The forensic psychologist’s casebook: Psychological profiling and criminal 
investigation. New York: Routledge. 
Alison, L., Alison, E., Noone, G., Elntib, S., Waring, S., & Christiansen, P. (2014). Whatever 
you say, say nothing: Individual differences in counter interrogation tactics amongst a field 
sample of right wing, AQ inspired and paramilitary terrorists. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 68, 170-175. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2014.04.031 
Blandón-Gitlin, I., Pezdek, K., Rogers, M., & Brodie, L. (2005). Detecting deception in children: 
An experimental study of the effect of event familiarity on CBCA ratings. Law and Human 
Behavior, 29, 187-197. doi:10.1007/s10979-005-2417-8  
Bogaard, G., Meijer, E. H., Vrij, A., & Merckelbach, H. (2016). Strong, but wrong: Lay people’s 
and police officers’ beliefs about verbal and nonverbal cues to deception. PloS One, 11, 
e0156615. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0156615 
Bond, C. F., & DePaulo, B. M. (2006). Accuracy of deception judgments. Personality and Social 
Psychology Review, 10, 214-234. doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_2 
Ceci, S. J., & DeSimone Leichtman, M. (1992). ‘I know that you know that I know that you 
broke the toy’: A brief report of recursive awareness among 3-year-olds. In S. J. Ceci, M. 
DeSimone Leichtman, & M. Putnick (Eds.), Cognitive and social factors in early deception 
(pp. 1-9). New Jersey: Psychology Press. 
POLICE OFFICERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF INCONSISTENCY  31 
 
Chan, S., & Bull, R. (2014). The effect of co-offender planning on verbal deception. Psychiatry, 
Psychology, & Law, 21, 457-464. doi:10.1080/13218719.2013.835703 
Charman, S. D., Kavetski, M., & Mueller, D. H. (2017). Cognitive bias in the legal system: 
Police officers evaluate ambiguous evidence in a belief-consistent manner. Journal of 
Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 6, 193-202. doi:10.1016/j.jarmac.2017.02.001 
Cherulnik, P. D., Way, J. H., Ames, S., & Hutto, D. B. (1981). Impressions of high and low 
Machiavellian men. Journal of Personality, 49, 388-400. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
6494.1981.tb00221.x 
Cohen, J. (2001). Errors of recall and credibility: Can omissions and discrepancies in successive 
statements reasonably be said to undermine credibility of testimony? Medico-Legal Journal, 
69, 25-34. doi:10.1258/rsmmlj.69.1.25 
Dando, C., Wilcock, R., & Milne, R. (2009). The Cognitive Interview: Novice police officers' 
witness/victim interviewing practices. Psychology, Crime & Law, 15, 679-696. 
doi:10.1080/10683160802203963 
Deeb, H., Granhag, P. A., Vrij, A., Strömwall, L. A., Hope, L., & Mann, S. (2018). Visuospatial 
counter-interrogation strategies by liars familiar with the alibi setting. Applied Cognitive 
Psychology. Advance online publication. doi:10.1002/acp.3383 
Deeb, H., Vrij, A., Hope, L., Mann, S., Granhag, P. A., & Lancaster, G. (2017). Suspects’ 
consistency in statements concerning two events when different question formats are used. 
Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling, 14, 74-87. doi: 10.1002/jip.1464 
DePaulo, B. M., Lindsay, J. J., Malone, B. E., Muhlenbruck, L., Charlton, K., & Cooper, H. 
(2003). Cues to deception. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 74-118. doi:10.1037/0033-
2909.129.1.74 
POLICE OFFICERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF INCONSISTENCY  32 
 
Dror, I. E., Champod, C., Langenburg, G., Charlton, D., Hunt, H., & Rosenthal, R. (2011). 
Cognitive issues in fingerprint analysis: Inter-and intra-expert consistency and the effect of a 
‘target’ comparison. Forensic Science International, 208, 10-17. 
doi:10.1016/j.forsciint.2010.10.013 
Elaad, E. (2003). Effects of feedback on the overestimated capacity to detect lies and the 
underestimated ability to tell lies. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 17, 349-363. 
doi:10.1002/acp.871 
Evans, J. R., Meissner, C. A., Brandon, S. E., Russano, M. B., & Kleinman, S. M. (2010). 
Criminal versus HUMINT interrogations: The importance of psychological science to 
improving interrogative practice. The Journal of Psychiatry & Law, 38, 215-249. 
doi:10.1177/009318531003800110 
Ewens, S., Vrij, A., Mann, S., & Leal, S. (2015). Using the reverse order technique with non-
native speakers or through an interpreter. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 30, 242-249. 
doi:10.1002/acp.3196 
Fischhoff, B. (1975). Hindsight is not equal to foresight: The effect of outcome knowledge on 
judgment under uncertainty. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 1, 288-299. doi:10.1037/0096-1523.1.3.288 
Fisher, R. P., Brewer, N., & Mitchell, G. (2009). The relation between consistency and accuracy 
of eyewitness testimony: Legal versus cognitive explanations. In R. Bull, T. Valentine, & T. 
Williamson (Eds.), Handbook of psychology of investigative interviewing: Current 
developments and future directions (pp. 121-136). Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. 
Fisher, R. P., Vrij, A., & Leins, D. A. (2013). Does testimonial inconsistency indicate memory 
inaccuracy and deception? Beliefs, empirical research, and theory. In B. S. Cooper, Applied 
POLICE OFFICERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF INCONSISTENCY  33 
 
issues in investigative interviewing, eyewitness memory, and credibility assessment (pp. 173-
189). New York: Springer. 
Geiselman, R. E. (2012). The Cognitive Interview for suspects (CIS). American College of 
Forensic Psychology, 30, 1-16. Retrieved from 
http://www.thectkgroup.com/pdf/cognitiveinterview.pdf  
Gongola, J., Scurich, N., & Quas, J. A. (2017). Detecting deception in children: A meta-analysis. 
Law and Human Behavior, 41, 44-54. doi:10.1037/lhb0000211 
Goodman-Delahunty, J., Martschuk, N., & Dhami, D. K. (2014). Interviewing high value 
detainees: Securing cooperation and disclosures. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 28, 883-897. 
doi:10.1002/acp.3087 
Granhag, P. A., Andersson, L. O., Strömwall, L. A., & Hartwig, M. (2004). Imprisoned 
knowledge: Criminals’ beliefs about deception. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 9, 
103-119. doi:10.1348/135532504322776889 
Granhag, P. A., Clemens, F., & Strömwall, L. A. (2009). The usual and the unusual suspects: 
Level of suspicion and counter‐interrogation tactics. Journal of Investigative Psychology and 
Offender Profiling, 6, 129-137. doi:10.1002/jip.101 
Granhag, P. A., & Hartwig, M. (2008). A new theoretical perspective on deception detection: On 
the psychology of instrumental mind-reading. Psychology, Crime & Law, 14, 189-200. 
doi:10.1080/10683160701645181 
Granhag, P. A., Rangmar, J., & Strömwall, L. A. (2015). Small cells of suspects: Eliciting cues 
to deception by strategic interviewing. Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender 
Profiling, 12, 127-141. doi:10.1002/jip.1413 
POLICE OFFICERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF INCONSISTENCY  34 
 
Granhag, P. A., & Strömwall, L. A. (1999). Repeated interrogations–Stretching the deception 
detection paradigm. Expert Evidence, 7, 163-174. doi:10.1023/A:1008993326434 
Granhag, P. A., & Strömwall, L. A. (2000). Effects of preconceptions on deception detection and 
new answers to why lie-catchers often fail. Psychology, Crime & Law, 6, 197-218. 
doi:10.1080/10683160008409804 
Granhag, P. A., & Strömwall, L. A. (2001a). Deception detection: Interrogators’ and observers’ 
decoding of consecutive statements. Psychology, Crime & Law, 135, 603-620. 
doi:10.1080/00223980109603723 
Granhag, P. A., & Strömwall, L. A. (2001b). Deception detection based on repeated 
interrogations. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 6, 85-101. 
doi:10.1348/135532501168217 
Granhag, P. A., & Strömwall, L. A. (2002). Repeated interrogations: Verbal and non-verbal cues 
to deception. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 16, 243-257. doi:10.1002/acp.784 
Granhag, P. A., Strömwall, L. A., & Hartwig, M. (2005). Granting asylum or not? Migration 
Board personnel's beliefs about deception. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 31, 29-
50. doi:10.1080/1369183042000305672 
Granhag, P. A., Strömwall, L. A., & Jonsson, A. C. (2003). Partners in crime: How liars in 
collusion betray themselves. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 33, 848-868. 
doi:10.1111/j.1559-1816.2003.tb01928.x  
Granhag, P. A., Strömwall, L. A., Willén, R., & Hartwig, M. (2013). Eliciting cues to deception 
by tactical disclosure of evidence: The first test of the Evidence Framing Matrix. Legal and 
Criminological Psychology, 18, 341-355. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8333.2012.02047.x 
POLICE OFFICERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF INCONSISTENCY  35 
 
Granhag, P. A., Vrij, A., & Verschuere, B. (2015). Detecting deception: Current challenges and 
cognitive approaches. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.  
Greuel, L. (1992). Police officers’ beliefs about cues associated with deception in rape cases. In 
F. Losel, D. Bender, & T. Bliesener (Eds.), Psychology and law: International perspectives 
(pp. 234–239). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 
Hartwig, M., Granhag, P. A., & Strömwall, L. A. (2007). Guilty and innocent suspects’ strategies 
during police interrogations. Psychology, Crime & Law, 13, 213-227. 
doi:10.1080/10683160600750264 
Hartwig, M., Granhag, P. A., Strömwall, L. A., & Andersson, L. O. (2004). Suspicious minds: 
Criminals’ ability to detect deception. Psychology, Crime and Law, 10, 83-95. 
doi:10.1080/1068316031000095485 
Hartwig, M., Granhag, P. A., Strömwall, L. A., & Doering, N. (2010). Impression and 
information management: On the strategic self-regulation of innocent and guilty suspects. 
The Open Criminology Journal, 3, 10-16. doi:10.2174/1874917801003020010 
Hartwig, M., Granhag, P. A., Strömwall, L., & Vrij, A. (2005). Detecting deception via strategic 
disclosure of evidence. Law and Human Behavior, 29, 469-484. doi:10.1007/s10979-005-
5521-x 
Harvey, A. C., Vrij, A., Leal, S., Hope, L., & Mann, S. (2017). Deception and decay: Verbal lie 
detection as a function of delay and encoding quality. Journal of Applied Research in 
Memory and Cognition, 6, 306-318. doi:10.1016/j.jarmac.2017.04.002 
Kashy, D. A., & DePaulo, B. M. (1996). Who lies?. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 70, 1037-1051. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.70.5.1037 
POLICE OFFICERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF INCONSISTENCY  36 
 
Kassin, S. M. (2015). The social psychology of false confessions. Social Issues and Policy 
Review, 9, 25-51. doi:10.1111/sipr.12009 
Lakhani, M., & Taylor, R. (2003). Beliefs about the cues to deception in high- and low-stake 
situations. Psychology, Crime & Law, 9, 357-368. doi:10.1080/1068316031000093441 
Lancaster, G. L. J., Vrij, A., Hope, L., & Waller, B. (2013). Sorting the liars from the truth 
tellers: The benefits of asking unanticipated questions on lie detection. Applied Cognitive 
Psychology, 27, 107-114. doi:10.1002/acp.2879 
Lawrence, H., Akehurst, L., Leach, A. M., Cherryman, J., Vrij, A., Arathoon, M., & Vernham, Z. 
(2017). ‘Look this way’: Using gaze maintenance to facilitate the detection of children's false 
reports. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 31, 69-80. doi:10.1002/acp.3303 
Leins, D. A., Fisher, R. P., & Vrij, A. (2012). Drawing on liars’ lack of cognitive flexibility: 
Detecting deception through varying report modes. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 26, 601-
607. doi:10.1002/acp.2837 
Leins, D. A., Fisher, R. P., Vrij, A., Leal, S., & Mann, S. (2011). Using sketch drawing to induce 
inconsistency in liars.  Legal and Criminological Psychology, 16, 253-265. 
doi:10.1348/135532510X501775 
Luke, T. J., Dawson, E., Hartwig, M., & Granhag, P. A. (2014). How awareness of possible 
evidence induces forthcoming counter‐interrogation strategies. Applied Cognitive 
Psychology, 28, 876-882. doi:10.1002/acp.3019 
Mac Giolla, E., & Granhag, P. A. (2015). Detecting false intent amongst small cells of suspects: 
Single versus repeated interviews. Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender 
Profiling, 12, 142-157. doi:10.1002/jip.1419 
POLICE OFFICERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF INCONSISTENCY  37 
 
Mac Giolla, E., Granhag, P. A., & Vernham, Z. (2017). Drawing-based deception detection 
techniques: A state-of-the-art review. Crime Psychology Review, 3, 23-38, 
doi:10.1080/23744006.2017.1393986 
Marlow, K., & Hilbourne, M. (2011). Using sketch statement to assist evidential presentation. 
iIIRG Bulletin, 3, 30-35. Retrieved from 
https://www.iiirg.org/assets/iIIRG_Bulletin_vol3_issue4.pdf 
Masip, J., & Herrero, C. (2015). Police detection of deception: Beliefs about behavioural cues to 
deception are strong even though contextual evidence is more useful. Journal of 
Communication, 65, 125-145. doi:10.1111/jcom.12135 
Masip, J., Martínez, C., Blandón-Gitlin, I., Sánchez, N., Herrero, C., & Ibabe, I. (2017). Learning 
to detect deception from evasive answers and inconsistencies across repeated interviews: A 
study with lay respondents and police officers. Frontiers in Psychology, 8, 2207. 
doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.02207 
Metropolitan Police. (2018). Am I eligible: Academic qualifications. Retrieved from 
http://www.metpolicecareers.co.uk/newconstable/eligibility.php 
Moston, S. J., & Stephenson, G. M. (1992). Predictors of suspect and interviewer behaviour 
during police questioning. In F. Lösel, D. Bender, & T. Bliesener (Ed.), Psychology and law: 
International perspectives (pp. 212-219). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 
Moston, S., Stephenson, G. M., & Williamson, T. M. (1992). The effects of case characteristics on 
suspect behavior during police questioning. British Journal of Criminology, 32, 23-40.  
Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on 
mental processes. Psychological Review, 84, 231-259. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.84.3.231 
POLICE OFFICERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF INCONSISTENCY  38 
 
Odinot G., Memon A., La Rooy D., & Millen A. (2013). Are two interviews better than one? 
Eyewitness memory across repeated Cognitive Interviews. PLoS ONE, 8: e76305. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0076305 
Park, H. S., Levine, T., McCornack, S., Morrison, K., & Ferrara, M. (2002). How people really 
detect lies. Communication Monographs, 69, 144-157. doi:10.1080/714041710 
Quan, D. (2015, July 29). ‘Less Kojak and more Dr. Phil’: How the law is forcing police 
interrogations to get kinder and gentler. National Post. Retrieved from 
http://news.nationalpost.com 
Roos af Hjelmsäter, E., Öhman, L., Granhag, P. A. & Vrij, A. (2014). ‘Mapping’ adolescents' 
deception: Eliciting cues to deceit through an unanticipated spatial drawing task. Legal and 
Criminological Psychology, 19, 179-188. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8333.2012.02068.x 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (2016). The art of an effective interview: Why non-accusatory 
is the new normal. Gazette Magazine, 79. Retrieved from http://www.rcmp-
grc.gc.ca/en/gazette/the-art-an-effective-interview?wbdisable=true 
Sakrisvold, M. L., Granhag, P. A., & Mac Giolla, E. (2017). Partners under pressure: Examining 
the consistency of true and false alibi statements. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 35, 75-90. 
doi:10.1002/bsl.2275 
Scheck, B., Neufeld, P. & Dwyer, T. (2000). Actual innocence: Five days to execution and other 
dispatches from the wrongly convicted. New York: Doubleday. 
Sooniste, T., Granhag, P. A., Strömwall, L. A., & Vrij, A. (2016). Discriminating between true 
and false intent among small cells of suspects. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 21, 
344-257. doi:10.1111/lcrp.12063 
POLICE OFFICERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF INCONSISTENCY  39 
 
Strömwall, L. A., & Granhag, P. A. (2003). How to detect deception? Arresting the beliefs of 
police officers, prosecutors and judges. Psychology, Crime & Law, 9, 19-36. 
doi:10.1080/10683160308138 
Stromwall, L. A., & Granhag, P. A. (2005). Children's repeated lies and truths: Effects on adults' 
judgments and reality monitoring scores. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 12, 345-356. 
doi:10.1375/pplt.12.2.345 
Strömwall, L.A., Granhag, P.A., & Jonsson, A. C. (2003). Deception among pairs: “Let’s say we 
had lunch and hope they will swallow it!”. Psychology, Crime & Law, 9, 109-124. 
doi:10.1080/1068316031000116238 
Strömwall, L. A., & Willén, R. M. (2011). Inside criminal minds: Offenders' strategies when 
lying. Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling, 8, 271-281. 
doi:10.1002/jip.148 
Tekin, S., Granhag, P. A., Strömwall, L. A., & Vrij, A. (2016). How to make perpetrators in 
denial disclose more information about their crimes. Psychology, Crime & Law, 22, 561-580. 
doi:10.1080/1068316X.2016.1168425 
Tekin, S., Granhag, P. A., Strömwall, L. A., & Vrij, A. (2017). Police officers' use of evidence to 
elicit admissions in a fictitious criminal case. Journal of Investigative Psychology and 
Offender Profiling, 14, 60-73. doi:10.1002/jip.1463 
Tonkin, S. (2015, July 21). Britain's biggest police force now demands that anyone wanting to 
join as a beat bobby has to be bilingual in one of 14 languages. Daily Mail Online. Retrieved 
from http://www.dailymail.co.uk 
Tulving, E., & Thomson, D. M. (1973). Encoding specificity and retrieval processes in episodic 
memory. Psychological Review, 80, 352-373. doi10.1037/h0020071 
POLICE OFFICERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF INCONSISTENCY  40 
 
Vredeveldt, A., van Koppen, P. J., & Granhag, P. A. (2014). The inconsistent suspect: A 
systematic review of different types of consistency in truth-tellers and liars. In R. Bull (Ed.), 
Investigative interviewing (pp. 183-207). New York: Springer.  
Vrij, A. (2005). Criteria-based content analysis: A qualitative review of the first 37 studies. 
Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 11, 3-41. doi:10.1037/1076-8971.11.1.3 
Vrij, A. (Ed.). (2008). Detecting lies and deceit: Pitfalls and opportunities. Chichester: John 
Wiley & Sons. 
Vrij, A., Akehurst, L., & Knight, S. (2006). Police officers', social workers', teachers' and the 
general public's beliefs about deception in children, adolescents and adults. Legal and 
Criminological Psychology, 11, 297-312. doi:10.1348/135532505X60816 
Vrij, A., Fisher, R. P., & Blank, H. (2017). A cognitive approach to lie detection: A meta‐
analysis. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 22, 1-21. doi:10.1111/lcrp.12088 
Vrij, A., Granhag, P. A., Mann, S., & Leal, S. (2011). Outsmarting the liars: Toward a cognitive 
lie detection approach. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 20, 28-32. 
doi:10.1177/0963721410391245 
Vrij, A., Granhag, P. A., & Porter, S. (2010). Pitfalls and opportunities in nonverbal and verbal 
lie detection. Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 11, 89-121. 
doi:10.1177/1529100610390861 
Vrij, A., Jundi, S., Hope, L., Hillman, J., Gahr, E., Leal, S., ... & Granhag, P. A. (2012). 
Collective interviewing of suspects. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and 
Cognition, 1, 41-44. doi:10.1016/j.jarmac.2011.12.002 
Vrij, A., Leal, S., Fisher, R. P., Mann, S., Dalton, G., Jo, E., ... & Houston, K. (2017). Sketching 
as a technique to eliciting information and cues to deceit in interpreter-based 
POLICE OFFICERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF INCONSISTENCY  41 
 
interviews. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition. Advance online 
publication. doi:10.1016/j.jarmac.2017.11.001 
Vrij, A., Leal, S., Granhag, P. A., Mann, S., Fisher, R. P., Hillman, J., & Sperry, K. (2009). 
Outsmarting the liars: The benefit of asking unanticipated questions. Law and Human 
Behavior, 33, 159-166. doi:10.1007/s 10979-008-9143-y 
Vrij, A., Leal. S., Mann, S., & Fisher, R. (2012). Imposing cognitive load to elicit cues to deceit: 
Inducing the reverse order technique naturally. Psychology, Crime, & Law, 18, 579-594. 
doi:10.1080/1068316X.2010.515987 
Vrij, A., Leal. S., Mann, S., Warmelink, L., Granhag, P. A., & Fisher, R. (2010). Drawings as an 
innovative and successful lie detection tool. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 24, 587-594. 
doi:10.1002/acp.1627 
Vrij, A., Mann, S., & Fisher, R. P. (2006a). Information-gathering vs accusatory interview style: 
Individual differences in respondents’ experiences. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 41, 589-599. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2006.02.014 
Vrij, A., Mann, S., & Fisher, R. P. (2006b). An empirical test of the Behaviour Analysis 
Interview. Law and Human Behavior, 30, 329-345. doi: 10.1007/s10979-006-9014-3 
Vrij, A., Mann, S., Leal. S, & Fisher, R. (2012). Is anyone there? Drawings as a tool to detect 
deceit in occupation interviews. Psychology, Crime & Law, 18, 377-388. 
doi:10.1080/1068316X.2010.498422 
Vrij, A., Mann, S., Leal, S., & Granhag, P. (2010).  Getting into the minds of pairs of liars and 
truth-tellers: An examination of their strategies. Open Criminology Journal, 3, 17-22. 
doi:10.2174/1874917801003010017 
POLICE OFFICERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF INCONSISTENCY  42 
 
Vrij, A., Mann, S., Robbins, E., & Robinson, M. (2006). Police officers ability to detect 
deception in high stakes situations and in repeated lie detection tests. Applied Cognitive 
Psychology, 20, 741-755. doi:10.1002/acp.1200 
Vrij, A., Meissner, C. A., Fisher, R. P., Kassin, S. M., Morgan, A., & Kleinman, S. M. (2017). 
Psychological perspectives on interrogation. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 12, 927-
955. doi:10.1177/1745691617706515 
Walsh, D., Oxburgh, G. E., Redlich, A. D., & Myklebust, T. (2015). International developments 
and practices in investigative interviewing and interrogation (Volume 1: Victims and 
witnesses). Oxford: Routledge Press.  
Warmelink, L., Vrij, A., Mann, S., Leal, S., & Poletiek, F. H. (2013). The effects of unexpected 
questions on detecting familiar and unfamiliar lies. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 20, 29-
35. doi: 10.1080/13218719.2011.619058 
Williamson, T., Milne, B., & Savage, S. (Ed.). (2009). International developments in 
investigative interviewing. Cullompton: Willan Publishing. 
  
POLICE OFFICERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF INCONSISTENCY  43 
 
Haneen Deeb is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Portsmouth, United Kingdom. She 
received a double PhD degree from the University of Portsmouth and the University of 
Gothenburg (Sweden) in 2017. Her research interests involve investigative interviewing and 
deception detection, particularly the development of interview techniques that enhance veracity 
judgments by eliciting statement (in)consistency cues. 
 
Aldert Vrij is a Professor of Applied Social Psychology at the University of Portsmouth, United 
Kingdom. His research work focuses on developing interviewing techniques with a cognitive 
load component to elicit verbal cues to deception. He is the contact person of the European 
Consortium of Psychological Research on Deception Detection. 
 
Lorraine Hope is a Professor of Applied Cognitive Psychology at the University of Portsmouth, 
United Kingdom. Her research concerns the development of theoretically-informed approaches 
to eliciting information and enhancing memory and decision-making under challenging 
conditions in policing and intelligence contexts. She is the founder of the Hope Applied 
Cognition Lab at the University of Portsmouth. 
 
Samantha Mann is a Senior Research Associate at the University of Portsmouth, United 
Kingdom. Her research focuses on developing methods to enhance interview situations and 
questioning in order to facilitate deception detection.  
 
Pär-Anders Granhag is a Professor of Psychology at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden. 
He has been conducting research on interviewing, interrogation, and deception detection for 30 
years. He is the founding director of the research unit for Criminal, Legal and Investigative 
Psychology at the University of Gothenburg. 
 
Leif A. Strömwall is a Professor of Psychology at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden, and is 
the deputy head at the Department of Psychology there since 2013. His research interests include 
legal and investigative psychology in general, and more specifically deception detection, 
credibility assessments, interrogation techniques, victim-blaming and eyewitness psychology.  
 
  
POLICE OFFICERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF INCONSISTENCY  44 
 
Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations for Responses to Closed Questions  
Closed Questions M SD 
1. To what extent do you believe the following are indicative of deceit or honesty a   
 Contradictions 2.77 1.47 
 Repetitions 4.24 0.89 
 Reminiscences 3.77 0.80 
 Omissions 3.42 0.92 
2. In deciding whether the suspect is lying or telling the truth, how often do you look for b  
 Contradictions 6.00 0.86 
 Repetitions 4.75 1.46 
 Reminiscences 5.04 1.28 
 Omissions 4.80 1.26 
 
3. If you have available two statements provided by a single suspect across two 
interviews, to what extent do you rely on b 
  
 Within-Statement inconsistency 5.10 1.03 
 Between-Statement inconsistency 5.04 1.14 
4. In a case with multiple suspects, each suspect interviewed more than once, and  
    critical evidence available, to what extent would you look for b 
 Within-Statement inconsistency 5.10 1.12 
 Between-Statement inconsistency 5.26 1.06 
 Statement-Evidence inconsistency 6.00 0.94 
 Within-Group inconsistency 5.46 1.06 
5. In general, to what extent do you find it difficult to assess c    
 Within-Statement inconsistency 3.48 1.22 
 Between-Statement inconsistency 3.27 1.06 
 Statement-Evidence inconsistency 2.61 1.24 
 Within-Group inconsistency 3.45 1.26 
6. Imagine that you questioned a suspect exhaustively, but their statement still did 
not match a critical piece of evidence. When you now confront the suspect with 
that evidence, do you believe liars are more likely to eliminate b 
  
Within-Statement inconsistency 4.31 1.04 
Statement-Evidence inconsistency 4.92 1.01 
   
7a. To what extent do you think liars find it important to eliminate b   
 Within-Statement inconsistency 5.34 1.00 
 Between-Statement inconsistency 4.99 1.11 
 Statement-Evidence inconsistency 4.90 1.19 
 Within-Group inconsistency 4.76 1.30 
7b. To what extent do you think truth-tellers find it important to eliminate b   
 Within-Statement inconsistency 5.55 1.38 
 Between-Statement inconsistency 5.46 1.38 
 Statement-Evidence inconsistency 5.41 1.48 
 Within-Group inconsistency 5.23 1.57 
a 7-point scale (1 = strongly indicative of deceit and 7 = strongly indicative of honesty). 
b 7-point scale (1 = never and 7 = always). c 7-point scale (1 = extremely easy and 7 = extremely difficult).   
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Table 2 
Categories and Corresponding Percentages for Responses to Open-Ended Questions  
 Open-Ended Questions Frequency 
1. In general, what type(s) of verbal cues are in your opinion the most 
important to decide whether the suspect is lying or telling the truth?  
 
 Amount of detail 
Statement inconsistency 
Refusal to answer/ avoiding question 
Fillers (e.g., honestly, um, like) 
Other cues 
62% 
46% 
39% 
14% 
45% 
2. Please describe how you would determine whether the suspect’s statement 
is inconsistent when you have available a single statement from one 
suspect [within-statement inconsistency].  
 
 Different cues such as details and plausibility 
Interview manipulation 
Contradictions 
Comparison of suspect statement with the evidence 
Confrontation of the suspect with the evidence after exhausting 
alternative explanations 
Other 
34% 
34% 
32% 
31% 
 
27% 
10% 
3. Please explain how you used inconsistency in drawings to determine 
whether the suspect was lying or not. 
 
 Correspondence between drawing and verbal statement 
Correspondence between drawing and evidence 
Improbable positioning of items within the drawing 
Unwillingness/Inability of the suspect to draw or complete the drawing 
Other 
44% 
33% 
14% 
11% 
14% 
   
4. Please insert any comments you might have about why you think (any of) 
the characteristics might or might not influence a suspect’s credibility?  
 
 Language proficiency (Suspects who are non-native speakers) 
Criminal history (Suspect’s experience with interviewing) 
Many factors combined to influence inconsistency 
Age (Young or elderly suspects more inconsistent than adults) 
Intelligence (Reduces inconsistency) 
Personality traits (Narcissism, anxiousness) 
Officer interviewing style 
Suspect vulnerability 
Officer confirmation bias 
Type of offence 
Time factors influence inconsistency 
Other 
33% 
30% 
20% 
18% 
15% 
13% 
13% 
10% 
10% 
5% 
5% 
23% 
 
